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More than a year ago, Olver et al. (1995) published their perspective on the definition of conservation principles for fisheries management. In their article, the authors discussed three aspects of conservation, within the general context of fisheries management:
(1) the North American history of European-based conservation ethics, (2) their proposal for a definition of the term 'conservation,' and (3) their proposal for seven conservation principles for use in fisheries management. In their concluding remarks, Olver et al. (1995 Olver et al. ( , p. 1592 state: "Our intent... is to promote an ecological ethic as the foundation for developing a set of conservation principles for the management of fisheries resources in Canada, and to present a set of conservation principles for fisheries management that will evoke a debate about just what those principles ought to be. With respect to the former, we would expect general support from the fisheries community, but we are under no illusion that the fisheries community will endorse this preliminary statement of conservation principles. Any subsequent debate that this article may spark will, however, contribute to a further refinement and elucidation of such principles." Olver et al. (1995) are among the first Canadian fisheries scientists to propose a conservation ethic for fisheries management. We support this undertaking. We agree with their suggestion that Canadian fisheries are in urgent need of an effective conservation ethic that will guide future policy development and management activities (Callicott 1991) . In support of their objectives and their explicit request for further debate on this topic, we wish to respond to their proposal by identifying three aspects of the conservation ethic.
The founding role of explicit values in a conservation ethic
Within the discipline of applied ethics, an ethic is an integrated system of values, principles, and judgements that determines the difference between right and wrong in human behaviour (Beauchamp and Childress 1979; Thomas 1983; Regan 1984 ). Within such a system, values are motivational factors that dispose people to act. Principles are guiding factors, formulated as general rules of conduct, that promote the satisfaction of particular values. Judgements are deciding factors; the specific applications of a general principle. Ranking principles, in turn, depends on the weighting of values upon which they are based. If one wishes to define an ethic, one must attempt to determine and rank the underlying values, articulate the principles, and establish the specific rules for making judgements. Olver et al. (1995) do not explicitly identify the values underlying their conservation ethic. As a result, the reader must try to isolate and interpret implicit references to founding values in the text. For example, in different places the authors apparently make reference to some of their values by using phrases such as "biodiversity," "continuity of ecosystem processes," "ecosystem sustainability," "ecosystem integrity," "ecosystem health," and "healthy life-support systems." If these are in fact references to values underlying Olver et al.'s (1995) conservation ethic, then the reader faces the task of determining what these values actually are. Although phrases such as ecosystem integrity and ecosystem health sound appealing, several other authors have warned about problems with such concepts, because they are often ill defined and they may be based on invalid theoretical foundations (e.g., Suter 1993; Callicott 1995; Wicklum and Davies 1995; Ghilarov 1996) . Without a full and clear explanation of what Olver et al. (1995) mean by these phrases, the possibility exists for development of inconsistent principles and judgements. For this reason, we see the need for further debate on the values underlying the proposed conservation ethic that Olver et al. (1995) have initiated.
The effect of ambiguous values extends into other aspects of Olver et al.'s (1995) conservation ethic. For example, consider the authors' definition of the term "conservation" (Olver et al. 1995 (Olver et al. , p. 1587 that humans derive social, economic, recreational, and cultural benefits in a sustainable manner. A definition of conservation consistent with this position follows: the protection, maintenance, and rehabilitation of native biota, their habitats, and life-support systems to ensure ecosystem sustainability and biodiversity."
We recognize two general problems with this definition. First, it appears to us that Olver et al. (1995) attempt to define the term conservation by combining some of the ill-defined values discussed above. Second, and more importantly, the wording of Olver et al.'s (1995) definition of conservation is so general that it would be difficult to employ it as an operational tool (see Peters 1991) . Imagine the difficulty in trying to determine whether a particular fisheries management action would be consistent or inconsistent with the definition of conservation presented above. For this reason, we suggest that it would be more useful to work on defining the structure and function of a conservation ethic, rather than to define the actual term conservation.
The absence of clearly defined values in the article by Olver et al. (1995) also makes it impossible to determine whether their set of proposed conservation principles are actually coherent and consistent with their founding values (i.e., do the principles promote the satisfaction of a particular value?). We strongly urge Olver et al. (1995) and others, to revisit the task of explicitly identifying the values held by fisheries biologists with respect to conservation. What motivates their interest and understanding in conservation as it applies to fisheries? Why is this an important subject of development and debate in their discipline? By answering these kinds of questions, they should be able to define biological values in a manner that facilitates greater understanding of the connection between values and principles. We realize that such an undertaking is no small task; however, we consider this to be a primary requisite for the development of an effective conservation ethic.
Essential biological objectives for a fisheries conservation ethic
If we assume that Olver et al. (1995) will be successful in articulating the conservation values of fisheries biologists, what happens then? Will it simply be a matter of using the newly defined biological values to construct a conservation ethic by evaluating, selecting, and refining principles that promote the satisfaction of those biological values? This seems to be the approach adopted by Olver et al. (1995 Olver et al. ( , p. 1585 in their paper:
"Our concern, shared by Parsons (1993) , is that the lack of a clear definition of conservation may foster misconceptions about the degree to which biological objectives can be safely traded off against pressing economic and social objectives. Our purpose is to promote a dialogue about the meaning and practice of conservation, in the hope that this will lead toward consensus on essential biological objectives [our emphasis]."
Clearly, the authors believe that it is desirable to establish the primary constraints of a fisheries conservation ethic in biological terms, thus setting the bounds within which economic and social issues may further shape fisheries management decisions. These primary constraints would effectively establish the minimum criteria of biological conditions for fisheries management that could not be "traded-off" under any circumstances. At first glance this appears to be perfectly reasonable; however, closer consideration of the argument raises two important concerns. First, we must ask what biological objectives for fisheries management are, and how these differ from social and economic objectives. Although this issue is at the heart of Olver et al.'s (1995) paper, the authors do not clearly distinguish between the different kinds of objectives for fisheries management (see Hilborn and Walters 1992) . To demonstrate the difficulty of this question, we would ask the reader to reflect on what is meant by biological objectives. When we refer to biological objectives are we talking about the interests of the fish populations that would support a fishery or perhaps the ecosystem (however defined) that would support the fish populations, or are we talking about the interests of humans who seek to benefit from the fishery? Such fundamental questions have profound ramifications on what might be meant by the phrase essential biological objective.
A second major concern with Olver et al.'s (1995) essential biological objectives has to do with the practicality of focussing exclusively on biological factors to establish the primary constraints of a conservation ethic (Mangel et al. 1996) . Is it desirable, or even possible, to establish biological objectives (however defined) without consideration of social or economic factors? Are biological objectives themselves not a form of social or economic objective? Olver et al. (1995 Olver et al. ( , p. 1586 implicitly recognize the difficulty in separating these factors when they refer to "the concept of the ecosystem approach (Christie et al. 1986 ), which aims to balance ecological, economic, and social objectives and recognizes that human uses must be reconciled with intrinsic and necessary functions and structures." In their proposal, the authors proceed with the development of a conservation ethic as if it were possible to identify and define essential biological objectives.
This predicament leads to further difficulties when Olver et al. (1995) propose their fisheries conservation principles. Consider, for example, the difficulty Olver et al. (1995 Olver et al. ( , p. 1591 ) encounter when discussing their biological objective regarding direct exploitation of spawning aggregations: "The west coast anadromous stocks spend much of their life cycle in oceanic habitats so large that efficient harvesting is not possible. Only when they form natural aggregations, just before spawning, are they sufficiently concentrated in space to be effectively harvested. The abundance and economic value of these stocks justify large expenditures for the assessment and enforcement activities necessary to restrict spawner-targeted harvests to levels where the risk to sustainability is acceptable.
Among freshwater stocks, only a tiny percentage of the millions of discrete stocks scattered throughout the lakes and rivers of Canada are of sufficient economic importance to support the information-intensive, micromanagement practices demanded by spawner-targeted harvesting." Clearly, the authors have taken socioeconomic considerations into account as a primary constraint in the development of this principle. In this case, Olver et al. (1995) argue that the harvest of spawning fish is acceptable, if and only if the economic value of that harvest is sufficiently great to justify the application of appropriate stock assessment methods. Have the authors not, in fact, delivered a biological objective that is already traded off against economic concerns?
Stakeholder values on essential biological objectives
It should be clear that Olver et al. (1995) framed the development of their conservation ethic within the context of Western biological science. While we do not question the necessity of incorporating Western biological values into a modern fisheries conservation ethic, we do question whether such a context is sufficient for definition of essential biological objectives. It would be naive to suggest that biologists are the only stakeholders in Canadian fisheries that hold values related to biological objectives for fisheries conservation. Within the context of Canadian fisheries, the potential stakeholder groups would include the following broad categories: (i) Aboriginal communities (First Nations), (ii) commercial fisheries, (iii) recreational fisheries, (iv) environmental protection organizations, (v) fisheries biologists, (vi) fisheries managers, and (vii) the general public. While each of these groups may have social or economic interests in a particular fishery, they may also hold biological values for fisheries conservation that are not held by most fisheries biologists. While the conservation ethic proposed by Olver et al. (1995) may provide a good fit with the biological values of some fisheries interest groups, the authors did not explicitly attempt to incorporate the biological values of other major stakeholder groups in their conservation ethic. According to recommended fisheries management practices, any important management action (biological or otherwise) requires consultation and meaningful consideration of major stakeholders' values (Felt 1990; Decker and Krueger 1993; Ballweber and Jackson 1996) . A possible consequence of not considering the biological values of stakeholders is to marginalize those people and to unjustly impose a set of rules on a group that holds dissimilar values (Peyton 1987) . We are particularly concerned that Olver et al. (1995) developed their conservation ethic without any consideration of Aboriginal values or perspectives on fishes and fisheries. We consider this omission to be particularly noteworthy, given the authors' own reference to the Regina versus Sparrow (1990) case at the outset of their paper. The Sparrow case is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, which establishes several precedents for the management of fisheries in this country (Usher 1991) including the need for meaningful consultation with Aboriginal communities on issues related to conservation:
"Within the analysis of justification, there are further questions to be addressed, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry. Those include the question of ... whether the Aboriginal group in question has been consulted with respect to the conservation measures being implemented." (Regina vs. Sparrow 1990, p. 34.) More recently, Regina versus Van der Peet (1996) , along with the companion appeals in Regina versus Gladstone (1996) and Regina versus N.T.C. Smokehouse (1996) raise an important issue left unresolved in Sparrow; the manner in which Aboriginal rights, recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act (1982) of Canada, are to be defined: "... the doctrine of Aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s.35(1), because of one simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, Aboriginal peoples were already here, living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries. It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates Aboriginal peoples from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal, and now constitutional, status. More specifically, what s.35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through which the fact that Aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of the Crown." (Regina vs. Van der Peet 1996, p. 48.) Thus, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, Aboriginal communities represent a special class of fisheries stakeholder; this distinction is based on the fundamental difference between the legal concepts of "rights" versus "privileges" (Turpel 1991) .
In our opinion there is a clear ethical requirement for Olver et al. (1995) and others to take special care in considering Aboriginal perspectives on fisheries conservation. However, we should caution that there is tremendous potential for differences in the perspectives of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal stakeholders on the roles of science and technology in determining conservation principles for "resource management" (Gamble 1986 , Deloria 1995 see also Dwyer 1994) . Incorporating stakeholder values into an ethic regarding fisheries conservation is going to require substantial effort; incorporating Aboriginal values on this matter will be a challenge (e.g., Freeman 1985; McDaniels et al. 1994) .
Future development of a conservation ethic for fisheries management
Based on our discussion of issues raised by Olver et al.'s (1995) proposed conservation ethic, we would like to pose three general questions regarding future development on this topic.
(1) How can we provide a more complete explanation of the founding biological values and the manner in which conservation principles promote these values? (2) How can we distinguish between essential biological objectives and social or economic objectives for fisheries management, and is it possible to establish a conservation ethic solely on essential biological objectives? (3) How do we propose to incorporate other stakeholders' values in the establishment of a conservation ethic for fisheries management? It is our hope that these questions continue the constructive debate on the conservation ethic for fisheries management initiated by Olver et al. (1995) .
